Abstract. The literature on survey data fabrication is fairly thin, given the serious threat it poses to data quality. Recent contributions have focused on detecting interviewer fabrication, with an emphasis on statistical detection methods as a way to efficiently target reinterviews. We believe this focus to be too narrow. The paper looks at the problem of fabrication in a different way, exploring new data that shows the problem goes beyond interviewer curbstoning. A surprising amount of apparent fabrication is easily detected through comparatively rudimentary methods such as analysis of duplicate data. We then examine the motivations behind survey data fabrication and explore the utility of fraud investigation frameworks in detecting survey data fabrication. We finish with a brief discussion of the importance of additional research in this area and suggest questions worth exploring further. This paper is a synthesis of presentations given by the authors at an event sponsored by the Washington Statistical Society. 
Introduction
For as long as researchers have been conducting surveys, data fabrication has been a concern. Crespi best summarized the situation when confronted with the same issue in 1945, writing "it is no secret that the prevalence and amount has been in many instances far from negligible, and it is widely agreed that the problem must be solved if the opinion research technique is to preserve its status as a reliable tool of inquiry." Despite this concern expressed decades ago, the literature on fabrication prevention and detection has remained steadfastly underdeveloped. Periodically, new contributions are made, with one significant recent volume from Winker et al. [21] , but they are too few and far between. The incentive for individual organizations to ignore or deny the problem is considerable, making further development all the more difficult.
Much of the current literature focuses on detection methods, with most attention given to fabrication at the interviewer level [1, 2] . The survey industry has not adequately prepared for other sources and forms of fabrication, and a sustained effort is needed to catch up. In addition to the instances contained in this paper, Robbins [15] and Faranda [11] report cases that go beyond interviewer-level fabrication.
This paper summarizes four of the five presentations given in December 2014 at an event sponsored by the Washington Statistical Society (WSS) entitled "Curbstoning, a Too Neglected and Very Embarrassing Survey Problem". A paper covering the fifth presentation, published earlier this year [12] , addressed the relationship between 'survey culture' and fabrication prevention and detection. The focus of the WSS session was to extend the survey industry's understanding of survey data fabrication and consider strategies beyond traditional practice. This event was the first in a yearlong series of conferences, panel discussions, and other events that will explore this issue in more detail and serve as the basis for further research and publication.
The paper begins with a discussion of how and why the traditional focus on interviewer-level fabrication is no longer sufficient (Section 2). Sections 3 and 4 explore several data sets from recent international surveys containing extensive "duplicate data", or instances of identical data within two or more cases in the same data file. The apparent fabrication in these cases extends far beyond what would be possible for individual interviewers in a traditional curbstoning scenario. These instances demonstrate why prevention and detection methods must continue to evolve to account for new forms and sources of fabrication (Section 5). The remaining sections examine two ideas for fabrication detection and prevention: motivation analysis and fraud detection. The motivation to fabricate may hold clues for how the data is fabricated, and thus what prevention and detection methods will be effective (Sections 6 and 7). Fraud detection methods also bear important similarities to fabrication detection (Section 8). We conclude with an exhortation for more research in this underdeveloped field (Section 9).
Survey fabrication beyond curbstoning 2
Fabricators have outpaced industry-standard detection systems and methods and have taken the lead in this high stakes footrace. This problem affects more than just small organizations without the resources or expertise to dedicate to this issue. The research organizations involved in the datasets mentioned in this paper are leading colleges and universities, survey companies, and government agencies.
In some cases, the scale of data fabrication relative to the total number of interviewers is sufficient to call 2 There are differing uses of the key terms "fabrication" and "falsification" in relation to survey data in the literature. There are important differences between the two in terms of their statistical signatures, and thus the methods that may be used to detect each. For our own purposes, we adopt the definition, offered by the Department of Health and Human Services 42 CFR Part 93.103, which defines each as follows (ORI 2005 ).
-Fabrication is making up data or results and recording or reporting them. -Falsification is manipulating research materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that the research is not accurately represented in the research record.
findings from the datasets into question as well as to require further investigation into their validity. AAPOR's recommended standard is to report instances where "a single interviewer or a group of colluding interviewers allegedly falsify either more than 50 interviews or more than two percent of the cases" [2] . The instances we examine here far surpass this recommended threshold.
The scale of fabrication also holds implications for detection methods. Statistical methods of fabrication detection traditionally operate under the assumption that most of the data file is real, and various forms of outlier detection will find patterns distinct enough to suggest fabrication. These methods rely on finding clusters of rare response patterns within a small number of interviewers' caseloads. Evidence suggests that we must call this assumption into question and expand our toolkit to enable detection of fabrication on a larger scale.
Even small-scale fabrication can have an impact on multivariate statistics in some cases, as Schräpler and Wagner [17] point out. Large-scale fabrication holds even more serious implications for statistical inference. In the cases we review here, the amount of fabrication is sufficient to create concerns for analyses as simple as basic frequencies and cross tabulations. Simply put, when fabrication reaches such a large scale, any substantive conclusions from analysis of the data can be unreliable and prone to unquantifiable errors.
Recent advances in fabrication research have largely focused on interviewer deviations [21] , a field that still needs further development. Even as this progress on "curbstoning 3 " continues, there is scant research on preventing and detecting fabrication elsewhere in the chain of survey data collection and processing. Little attention has been paid to supervisors, keypunchers, managers, or others in terms of their potential role in data fabrication. A comprehensive program to prevent and detect fabrication must take an expansive view of who in the organization may be involved.
To foster the development of such programs, research is needed beyond consideration of the wayward interviewer sitting on the proverbial curbstone and fabricating individual interview responses. We may be seeing the emergence of "machine-assisted fabrication", where a computer is used to generate fake data en masse, rather than relying on creation of individual paper and pencil questionnaires.
The data produced by machine-assisted fabrication could take a variety of forms, since a computer could theoretically be used to generate data to fit any desired pattern. The patterns we explore here are alarmingly simple, with copy-and-paste appearing as the most prevalent detected pattern. We must remain aware of the possibility of other potential types of machineassisted fabrication that may produce more subtle patterns that are harder to detect. The patterns that would result from clever use of a computer by a skilled statistician would look quite different from what we present here or what is typically discussed in the literature.
The cases we examine here are from international surveys, each using face-to-face methods with interviewers assigned to record responses via paper and pencil (PAPI). This may not be coincidence. For now, there is no research quantifying the existence or risk of fabrication by country or by method, though Lavrakas [14] speaks of a "consensus" that research conducted at centralized phone facilities is at low risk of fabrication. But fabrication prevention and detection is arguably most difficult in remote environments where both supervision and technical countermeasures are harder. Paper and pencil surveys, for example, render impossible some current technology-based methods of fabrication prevention and detection.
Conducting surveys in developed countries today, whether telephone or face-to-face, typically generates significant paradata, meaning data generated as a byproduct of the survey process. This may include data about interview start and stop times, GPS locations, audio recording, and remote supervision. Analysis of paradata can be used to identify interviewers who deviate from the prescribed routines [19] and single out interviews for additional investigation.
The presence of these countermeasures appears to make it more difficult for an interviewer to fool supervision and successfully fabricate data without detection. Furthermore, when the dataset is generated automatically as a result of data collection, such as with telephone interviewing or computer-assisted personal interviewing, it removes major opportunities for fabrication. Even so, fabrication happens in developed countries [21] , and the development of prevention and detection methods must continue.
Analysis of duplicate data
In remote areas, the task of fabrication prevention is more difficult and new methods are needed to improve and ensure data quality. Our first suggestion for improving the survey fabrication detection toolkit is a simple one: conduct an analysis of duplicate data. This refers to exploring the prevalence of repeated instances of identical data within two or more interviews (cases) in the same data file.
Looking for duplicate data is not necessarily a new idea, but the practice does not appear to be in widespread use, based on the ease with which we discovered large amounts of duplicate data in publicly available datasets from reputable survey organizations. Analysis of duplicates bears similarities to recordlinkage methods, a field of inquiry with a long history which may hold promise for future improvements in fabrication detection.
The duplicate data we discuss here take several forms. In some instances, there are lengthy "duplicate strings," which refers to consecutive variables within a case where response values are repeated in one or more other cases elsewhere in the data file. There are also "near-duplicate cases," where a very high percentage of a case's values are duplicated. In extreme cases, there are full duplicate cases, where the entire case appears more than once in the data file, with the exception perhaps of case IDs or other administrative data. And in the most absurd form of all, we see "duplicate blocks," where entire blocks of two or more consecutive cases are duplicated in the same data set.
These forms overlap in some ways, which matter for their detection. For example, a full duplicate case could be seen as a duplicate string where the string length is equal to the entire case. A near duplicate case may be the result of a very long duplicate string, though it may not be if some of the variables were manually altered. Examining each form of duplication individually is useful because they may exist independently, and because the specific patterns in the data may suggest how the fabricated data was generated and why. For example, a duplicate block suggests a rectangular block of data was copied and pasted within a spreadsheet program. Near duplicates may indicate a copy and paste with some attempt to disguise the duplication. And duplicate strings pasted onto the end of what otherwise appear to be legitimate interviews may indicate interviewers taking shortcuts by fabricating only the end of an interview.
Duplicate data represent a possible indicator of fabrication because one would expect to see some variation in how individuals respond to surveys. Based on the mechanics of answering questions, it would be quite unlikely for two individuals to give identical an-swers to a large number of questions. The mental processes respondents undertake when answering survey questions can be viewed as having multiple steps, each of which can contribute to variability in responses. Tourangeau et al. [20] present a useful, four-step model of cognition, retrieval, judgment, and response. Each step of the process contributes variation to survey response, meaning even two respondents who largely agree with one another would likely answer some questions differently. Misinterpretation of questions, imperfect recall, erroneous inference, and differing interpretations of scales offered for responses are among the many factors that would add even more variation to question responses. There will be still greater variation to the extent that people actually disagree with one another -as they often do. Further error, and hence variation, enters real data through such factors such as limited interviewer comprehension, poor transcription and mistakes in data entry [4] .
All of this makes it virtually impossible that a large number of duplicate cases could result from legitimate interviews, especially in longer surveys and when the numbers of duplicates climb into the hundreds, as they do in instances presented in this paper. Robbins [15] argues there is no meaningful difference in the probability of a case where 99 percent of the data is duplicated vs a full duplicate, in a survey of at least moderate length.
There are idiosyncrasies in every dataset which may lead to some pieces of duplicated data. Consecutive questions with little variance would be one example. In general, though, when lengthy duplicate strings or full duplicate cases appear in the data, especially clustered by interviewer, supervisor, or keypuncher, one may strongly suspect fabrication.
To examine an instance where duplicate analysis can lead us to suspect fabrication, we consider several international surveys covering multiple countries. The sponsors for these surveys were a combination of major US universities and government agencies. They were fielded by large and reputable survey organizations and analyzed by experienced researchers. They did not fit the description offered by Lavrakas [14] , who writes "The most serious [of fabrication] cases seem to occur in small studies by researchers who do not have professional survey services at their disposal." Table 1 shows the prevalence of duplicate cases in a selection of international surveys. These surveys were chosen based on the ease of access to the raw data on the internet. This research did not include a systematic exploration of publicly available datasets, though this would be a task perhaps worthy of future research. These duplicates were found using the "identify duplicate cases" function in SPSS, with slight modifications. As is readily apparent, full duplicate cases are very prevalent in these datasets, representing hundreds of cases and between 28 percent and 66 percent of cases in each data file.
It is strange that full duplicate cases are as easy to find as was the case in this analysis. Full duplicate cases are the simplest and easiest form of fabrication to detect. Some statistical packages even have menu commands to find duplicates. With more attention to the issue and public discussion, it may be that duplicates will become a far less frequent form of fabrication in the future, or at least one that is caught more frequently during data collection and processing.
If so, it will eliminate one form of fabrication and one of the easiest to detect. Detection of duplicate data should only catch the least clever and most careless of fabricators. A clever fabricator may come up with more sophisticated methods that would evade this most basic of checks. This illustrates a basic and persistent challenge of fabrication detection. It is impossible to know for sure whether the fabrication that was discovered represents a full accounting or just the simplest and easiest to detect.
Also present in these same datasets are "duplicate blocks". These are an even more exaggerated form of full duplicate cases, where identical sets of cases appear more than once, in the same order, in different parts of the data file. Instances of duplicate blocks are scattered throughout the data files outlined above. The most extreme case found in the course of this research showed a block of 13 consecutive cases that had been fully duplicated in another part of the data file. There is no conceivable way that duplication could occur on such a large scale with these patterns solely an artifact of individual interviewers fabricating their own interviews, without collaborating, and entirely via paper and pencil. Large duplicate blocks represent a high level of carelessness on the part of the apparent fabricator. We expect this will become rarer as the search for duplicate cases and blocks become common.
Other forms of duplicate data
Duplication of data does not exclusively mean copying and pasting a whole interview. Other forms include partial duplication: for example, near duplicates or long duplicate strings as mentioned earlier. Near du- plicates are not discussed in-depth here, though Robbins [15] showed large numbers of near-duplicates data in Kuwait and Yemen in the Arab Barometer and data collected in Algeria for the World Values Survey. Instead, this section discusses a method used to identify the level of duplication in a survey and whether that duplication suggests the data may be fabricated. This fairly simple methodology was devised while evaluating two international surveys for possible fabrication.
Standard techniques focusing on outlying data clustered by interviewer were also applied, but it was in the simple examination of duplicate data where the most telling results were discovered. The data presented here is taken from two surveys done in the same country (other than those presented in Table 1 ). This analysis was conducted as a part of a contract (the details of which are confidential), to discover and provide evidence, if any, that fabrication had occurred. Several standard, interviewer-oriented detection methodologies from the literature were applied first, which essentially attempt to find suspicious response patterns clustered by interviewer. These methods revealed some cause for concern, though nothing that would allow for definitive conclusion. One newly apparent shortcoming of this type of analysis is its assumption that a majority of the data is not fabricated. When a large part of the data file is fabricated, detection by outlier detection will fail.
The level of duplication in the data was measured using two methods.
1. Count the number of questions between two cases with the same response. This is a straightforward tally of the exact same responses between any two interviews. A high percentage of matches would correspond to the definition of a "near duplicate case," offered above. 2. Determine the longest sequence (or string) of questions with the same responses between two cases. Very long sequences of responses that are exactly the same between two interviews, and include nearly the entire interview, would also qualify as a "near duplicate." When conducting a duplicate analysis, both definitions should be pursued. Robbins, for example, found in one case that after copying and pasting, the fabricator altered every 10 th answer. In this scenario, the first definition would suit better, since none of the duplicate strings would be suspiciously long. Alternatively, if the survey were composed of multiple-choice questions with few response choices, then many naturally shared responses would not be as improbable and we should look for sequences of exactly the same response. For the two surveys examined here, after trying both methods, the second definition proved more effective at identifying likely fabricated cases.
Given two random records (cases) for the same survey, there will be some natural amount of duplication between the two. To determine the amount of duplication that is "unnatural," the dataset itself can be used to construct a distribution of the duplication that exists between any two cases. For the second method described above, this distribution will represent a frequency of duplicate strings of various lengths (under the first method, the distribution would be the frequency of shared responses between two surveys). Constructing such a distribution characterizing the duplication for the entire survey is necessary because every dataset has unique characteristics that result in varied amounts of 'natural' duplication. For example, a dataset with many consecutive variables with little or no variance would be expected to have far longer average duplicate strings than a dataset with scale variables with high variance.
Creation of a distribution of maximum duplicate string lengths for each pair of cases allows analysis of patterns of duplicate strings. In other words, for a given case, what is the longest string it shares in common with each and every other case? The entire distribution, therefore, is composed of n(n − 1)/2 data points, where each data point represents the longest string of duplicates shared between two cases. For this case study, for one survey, this distribution is shown in Fig. 1 .
The figure shows that two randomly selected cases for this particular study share, on average, a maximum duplicate string length of about 4 to 6 responses. This distribution has a long tail, with some cases falling at the very extreme: every response to every question (all 138, "full duplicates") is duplicated between two or more cases. To identify cases for further investigation, an arbitrary but conservative cutoff of 50 percent was used for this tail, meaning 69 or more responses were exactly the same between two or more interviews. This amounted to 700+ cases (about 15 percent of the data file). This was a conservative cut-off, since the probability of 69 consecutive shared responses is vanishingly small. But using this cutoff gives the interviewer the benefit of the doubt, and as it turned out, still left a large number of cases under suspicion.
The cases at the tail end of the distribution were examined for clustering of suspicious cases in the workload of specific interviewers. Instead, this investigation uncovered a strong clustering of lengthy duplicate strings at the supervisor level. Table 2 provides the clustering of these 700+ cases.
The sharp distribution given by Table 2 casts a very high degree of suspicion on the workload at the supervisor level. Further analysis revealed that suspicious cases were across multiple interviewers within the same supervisor group, and shared between the same two interviewers in different supervisor groups. This suggests either collusion or fabrication at an even higher level where the fabrication occurs with the postcollection raw data by keypunchers.
Effects of widespread fabrication
In the above examples, we examine several forms of duplication. The question of how many ways survey data could be duplicated is emblematic of one of the larger challenges of data fabrication detection: the necessity of evolving methods to keep up with new forms of fabrication.
Because fabrication may look different each time, there will likely be nothing in the literature to use as a guidepost in many cases. The statistical signature may be different each time, meaning assessment of the likelihood fabrication will require judgment on the part of the analyst. This necessary use of judgment is also dangerous, since it leaves open the possibility of abuse on the part of the analyst. The general issue of how to reliably address an evolving threat is one that requires further research and discussion.
An uncomfortable implication of the facts that 1) fabrication can be machine-assisted and 2) the fabricators can be higher up the chain of command than interviewers is that the re-interview process is rendered less reliable as a method of confirming fabrication. Reinterviewing has been an extremely important component of the traditional fabrication detection and prevention process. These methods are primarily focused on allocating re-interviews more effectively to increase the odds of catching a fabricator. The search for suspicious patterns in the data is only a precursor. Confirmation only happened by deploying a second interviewer or supervisor to the same house to verify whether the interview had been conducted faithfully. If the supervisor or keypuncher is part of the fabrication problem, their outputs cannot be used to evaluate the presence or absence of fabrication.
The prevalence of such survey fabrication is an area for future research as detection methods become better developed. Development of different detection methods is critical, as we only catch the problems we seek, and most of the survey community's attention has been focused on the interviewer. The corollary is that we will never know how much we did not catch, and whether we have caught only the most careless and unimaginative [13] . Exploration into this issue has only just begun, but the anecdotal evidence of Winker et al. [21] indicates a larger problem.
With fabrication taking on new and exotic forms, our actions to counter it must also evolve. In doing so, we must rely on more than confirmatory reinterviews and increasingly elaborate statistical detection methods. These methods are needed, but we must not stop there. Prevention must also be a big part of our strategy. We also must do better at understanding why a person may choose to fabricate rather than following the research plan. Borrowing heavily from other fields such as fraud investigation also show promise.
Motivations for data fabrication
There are at least two benefits to better understanding the motivation to fabricate survey data. First, understanding motivation can help identify likely patterns that may be present in the data, and thus help determine methods to detect fabricated data. Second, understanding the motivation to fabricate helps develop strategies that prevent or minimize fabrication in the first place.
As examples of how motivation can help identify likely patterns, several papers [6, 9] have used cluster analysis to identify certain interviewers as the best candidates to follow-up on for more intensive investigation of possible fabrication. In their models, most of the indicators have the underlying assumption that interviewers are fabricating to make the most money in the shortest time.
The individual patterns that this behavior creates in the data can often be anticipated, allowing for detection using a variety of analytical techniques, which are then converted into indicators for cluster analysis. Examples of patterns used in this analysis include higher rates of responses with extreme or middle-scale responses, more rounding than usual, and answering screening questions in such a way as to skip subsequent questions, among many others. These indicators are then grouped together and analyzed by interviewer such that only a subset of suspicious interviewers receives in-depth review.
But aside from simply completing more interviews with less effort, there are many other reasons why staff at survey firms might want to fabricate survey data. One is simply to meet deadlines. If caseloads are unrealistic for the allotted field period, interviewers or others may fabricate data to meet deadlines. The data from such "interviews" may look quite different from a fabricator trying to create data for the most cases with the least amount of effort or in the shortest amount of time. In each of these scenarios, some of the indicators that might be relevant to detection procedures may be quite different. For example, the completion dates may be important instead of other indicators like rounded answers.
Other possible motivating factors include introducing deliberate data misrepresentation. If a fabricators goal is to bias estimates, systematic error is far more likely. Robbins [15] describes an example of this where certain interviewers were found to have fabricated responses to show support for an Islamist party. In this instance, there may be still different indicators that would be associated with the goal of deliberate introduction of bias rather than simply making answers quicker and faster.
Another possible cause is interviewer fatigue. They may complete a certain amount of their caseload and then stop putting in the same level of effort. This may suggest other indicators to include in a model, such as some data representing real, honestly conducted interviews, and some fabricated interviews. The scenario where some interviewers fabricate some of their interviews can make it quite difficult to detect fabrication [9] .
Interviewers may also be motivated by empathy for respondents and thus do things that they perceive will make responding easier for them. This may introduce yet another scenario, such as some interviewers fabricating some of the data in some of their interviews. This would likely make detection all the more difficult since the irregularities may be small enough to avoid suspicion when paired with some honest interviews and other partially-honest interviews.
These other potential motivators for fabricating suggest other kinds of indicators may be needed for effective detection protocols. Some examples worth additional exploration include speed indicators, length of interviews, incidence of incomplete interviews, patterns and frequency of missing data, and edit rates. If a larger share of data coming from certain interviewers needs to be edited or corrected, this may mean those interviewers are doing something different from the other interviewers.
Additional paradata like the information available from the contact history instrument (CHI) developed by the Census Bureau may provide additional indicators [3] . And of course, GPS tracking may also be useful information to understand what interviewers are (or are not) doing [8] .
Each of these methods has promise but also poses challenges, particularly in surveys conducted in remote and dangerous environments. In these instances, data collection tends to be via paper and pencil, which makes tight controls over administrative and paradata considerably more difficult and the resulting data less reliable.
Motivation in fabrication prevention
Statistical agencies would like to prevent as much fabrication as possible, a clearly preferable outcome to catching it after the fact. Here again, the motivation for fabricating data can be useful to examine, particularly the difference between intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation for field staff. Although the following discussion focuses primarily on interviewer motivation, the issues clearly apply to others such as supervisors, data entry, or project staff.
Motivation has been widely studied in social psychology (e.g. [16] ) and there are clear distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for behavior. Extrinsic motivation is a key focus of De Haas and Winker's work on interviewer fabrication (2014). Maximizing money income and reducing risk of being caught would each be examples of external rewards, or extrinsic motivation.
To illustrate money as an extrinsic motivation, imagine from the interviewer's point of view: "because of how much they are paying me, I'm going to collect the most accurate data possible." This is extrinsic motivation in the form of a paycheck. If interviewers responded clearly to this as motivation, it would lead to the question of adjusting interviewer pay to avoid fabrication. The pay scale that would be required to provide sufficient extrinsic motivation on its own would likely be exorbitant.
Another extrinsic motivator is the knowledge that someone is checking up on the interviewer's work, which increases the perceived risk of being caught cheating. If interviewers do not think that anyone is checking, they may not be motivated to put in the effort to collect accurate data, given the low perceived risk of simply fabricating the data rather than collecting it. Fabrication motivation is reduced when interviewers know that quality control procedures are in place and that people are monitoring their work. Fear of getting caught is the extrinsic motivation. In this case, interviewers are saying to themselves, "because I know they are checking my work, I'm going to collect the most accurate data possible."
However, the ability of many survey organizations to monitor interviewers is too weak to rely solely or primarily on monitoring as a motivation. Quality control monitoring or verification of field work is quite expensive and thus not likely to be conducted for most of an interviewer's caseload. A key reason for the importance of Winker's work and other statistical methods of detecting likely fabricators is that we cannot fully monitor or evaluate 100 percent of field work. Thus, methods for identifying which small slice of the field work is most important to monitor is crucial. With only a small percentage of interviews monitored, interviewers may not give much weight to the fear of being caught. To change this calculation, sponsors would have to improve their statistical detection methods to better allocate reinterviews, or find ways to confirm fabrication without reinterviewing.
In addition to extrinsic motivation, survey organizations can look at how to cultivate intrinsic motivation [12] . Intrinsic motivation comes from within the interviewers themselves and is internalized without external punishments or rewards. This can be accomplished in a number of ways. First, organizations have to minimize an "us versus them" culture. Survey organizations have to cultivate the idea that interviewers are on the same side as headquarters personnel and survey project leaders, and that project leaders and staff are all on the same side as respondents. That is, the field firm is not collecting data for their own benefit at the expense of respondents, but instead to produce results for the respondents' benefit. As survey researchers, we can encourage interviewers to think, "Because we are all on the same team, I'm going to collect the most accurate data possible."
Additionally, survey organizations can emphasize the value of the agency, encouraging interviewers to think "Because I work for my particular organization, I am going to collect the most accurate data possible." Or, "Because of the value of the work and because these statistics are so important, I'm going to collect the most accurate data possible." These intrinsic motivators would minimize the temptation for interviewers to fabricate.
One way to foster intrinsic motivation is investment in training and using training to increase employee engagement at all levels. This requires communication up and down the chain of responsibility, from survey managers to field managers to interviewers and back. Staff at all levels, not just survey program managers, must know why the survey and the data are important. If the interviewers do not feel that importance, if they have not gotten that message, they are less motivated to collect quality data. Here, we can refer the reader to Deming's famous 14 points (1982) on total quality management.
Fraud detection methods in fabrication prevention
In addition to the statistical, psychological, and organizational dynamics of fabrication, the survey community will be well-served to draw on the expertise of related fields. One such closely related field is fraud detection. The statistics behind fraud investigation are similar to survey fabrication detection. Below is a brief and condensed list of some of the statistical methodologies used in fraud detection [5] in medical billing fraud investigations that may have parallels in the survey research world.
-Data mining, or looking for unusual patterns of behavior and billing. This methodology assumes one has a basic understanding of the "expected" or "normal" behavior, e.g. population demographics or needs, and specific patterns of medical procedures. -Administrative and paradata analysis can be useful, such as understanding time limits for specific procedures. It is unlikely an individual can work 18 or more hours a day for a long time. -Spike models can be used to identify a significant or sudden change in an "expected" behavior (e.g., demographic or medical procedure billing). In surveys, sudden, unexpected changes in data patterns in longitudinal surveys can signal the need to explore the underlying records for potential quality control issues. -Link analysis, mapping, and using dot-plots can be used to represent relationships between individuals or organizations using both social and professional information. -Sampling of records to identify records for further investigation when checking the entire database is not practical given its size (Skwara 2008). This bears strong resemblance to planning recontacts in surveys to verify data collection. Much of the recent work on fabrication has focused on improvement over the simple random selection of records to more accurately target records with potential problems. -Adoption of predictive models allows the researcher to check for deviations from what is expected. In general, political opinion and demographics are different with geographic locations, giving the informed researcher an idea of what to expect from each area. Large deviations from expected opinion or demographic composition may give reason for further investigation. The same is true with the types of fraud schemes developed in different states or even areas within each state. Fraud detection has an advantage over fabrication detection in survey data in terms of the personnel who play a role in the process. In survey research, it often falls only to the sponsoring research organization to discover and investigate data fabrication. Medical fraud investigators may bring to bear a combination of statisticians, subject matter experts, medical review experts, compliance officers, and inspectors general. In addition to the above list, other techniques devised by fraud investigators (medical, financial, etc.) may be adaptable to the survey research world. If nothing else, the existence of a well-worked process of fraud investigation shows that the community is aware of the seriousness of the problem, an awareness not clearly in evidence in the survey community when it comes to fabrication.
Conclusion
The initial discoveries chronicled here are the result of relatively rudimentary detection methods. Robbins [15] offers evidence that the examples in this paper will soon be accompanied by others. De Haas and Winker [9] discuss anecdotal evidence that fabrication is more prevalent than what has been seen so far in the literature and Faranda [11] confirms it. The combination of fairly easy-to-detect instances along with further discoveries suggests the survey research field has fallen behind in the prevention and detection of data fabrication and will need to spend time and energy catching up. This is clearly a problem for those relying on the findings of survey research for important decisions.
This paper presented frameworks that may be used to help the industry catch up. Understanding the mental and cultural influences at play will help anticipate potential patterns in fabricated data. Fraud investigators use methods and staffing processes that may prove useful. Statistical methods will play a major role in any prevention and detection process.
Additional research is clearly needed into risk factors that impact the likelihood of fabrication. Based on this research as well as Robbins [15] , it appears that specific data collection methods may be more prone to abuse, with paper and pencil apparently the most risky. Location may also play a role, with dangerous and remote assignments more likely to result in data fabrication. Long and burdensome questionnaires may com-promise interviewer morale [11] , increasing the risk of fabrication. Each of these factors bears further exploration, as do methods to reduce or eliminate the risks introduced by each one.
Applying a combination of methods will help increase the effectiveness of methods to counter fabrication. Nobody wants to focus on survey data fabrication. It is an expensive distraction from our main purpose of using survey research as a tool of inquiry. But as Crespi notes, to earn the perception (and reality) of reliability, survey researchers must work for it.
